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Perché lavoratori simili ricevono salari diversi? In questo sag-
gio rivisito e confronto due linee di ricerca che hanno compiuto
notevoli progressi nella comprensione dei differenziali salariali: (i)
eterogeneità inosservata nel capitale umano ed autoselezione dei la-
voratori; (ii) potere monopsonistico delle imprese in mercati del la-
voro caratterizzati da frizioni di search. Ambedue queste ipotesi ve-
dono i differenziali salariali come fenomeno di equilibrio. Nono-
stante le profonde differenze concettuali e tecniche, esse restano le
due principali concorrenti in questa indagine. A differenza di altre
ipotesi, esse offrono spiegazioni unificanti dei flussi aggreganti nei
mercati del lavoro e della forma della distribuzione dei salari.
Why are similar workers paid differently? I review and compare
two lines of research that have recently witnessed great progress in
addressing “unexplained” wage inequality: (i) worker unobserved
heterogeneity in, and sorting by, human capital; (ii) firms’ monop-
sony power in labor markets characterized by job search frictions.
Both lines share a view of wage differentials as an equilibrium phe-
nomenon. Despite their profound conceptual and technical differ-
ences, they remain natural competitors in this investigation. Unlike
other hypotheses, they provide natural and unifying explanations for
job and worker flows, unemployment duration and incidence, job-to-
job quits, and the shape of the wage distribution [JEL Code: C73;
D31; D83; E24; J63; J64].
1. - Introduction
Why are similar workers paid differently? Ever since the
required datasets became available about 30 years ago, Mincerian
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SAGGIO AD INVITOhuman capital regressions have been able to “explain” only a rela-
tively small fraction of the cross-sectional and time-series variance
in individual earnings and wages.
1 The existence of sizable and
persistent wage differentials among observationally identical
workers poses a formidable challenge to the very core of labor
economics and of macroeconomics. In labor economics, at stake
is the empirical validity of the human capital model. For
macroeconomists, wage determination stubbornly remains the key
to understand aggregate business fluctuations (Shimer, 2005; Hall,
2005). The mere failure of the law of one price is an intriguing
fact that deserves investigation. 
In this article I review and compare two lines of research that
have addressed «unexplained» wage inequality from two concep-
tually different viewpoints. These two lines appeal to two well-es-
tablished ideas, respectively, unobserved heterogeneity in human
capital and firms’ monopsony power in frictional labor markets.
The former approach, inspired by the celebrated Roy (1951) mod-
el of sorting in labor markets, and pioneered in a dynamic con-
text by the equally celebrated contributions of Jovanovic (1979,
1984), views a job as an “inspection” and “experience” good.
Namely, workers and firms are heterogeneous in ways that not
even they, let alone the statistician, can fully describe; the “fit” be-
tween their characteristics can be learned only from direct ex-
perience, just like in a marriage. Wages are reset based on evolv-
ing inside and outside options of workers and firms. The approach
based on unilateral wage offers supported by search frictions,
since the seminal contribution of Diamond (1971), builds on the
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1A major recent advance in several countries is the availability of longitudinal
matched employer-employee datasets. Like panel data, they track workers through
their careers and firms as they lose and hire workers; unlike panel data, they also
tell us who works for whom. They allow to decompose wage differentials into the
contributions of the worker, of the firm they work for, and of the «match» (the
residual). The basic message remains (e.g., ABOWD J. et AL. (1999) for France and
the US): unobserved worker characteristics, both common to all jobs and match-
specific, exist and matter for wages. At the same time, firms differ systematically
by productivity, and their heterogeneity is very persistent (FOSTER L. et AL., 2001).
In principle, the data can tell us whether this is because some firms attract better
workers, or because they have higher TFP, so that reallocation of labor across
firms is an important contributor to aggregate productivity growth, or both
(“positive assortative matching”).monopsony power that firms possess due to their employees’ in-
ability to instantaneously locate alternative employment opportun-
ities. 
Recent incarnations of these two lines of research, as exem-
plified (resp.) by Moscarini (2005) and by the very influential the-
ory of Burdett and Mortensen (1998), converge on the importance
of search frictions, but go one step further. They take an equilib-
rium approach, to account not only for observed wage differen-
tials, but also for many additional and potentially related facts.
Involuntary unemployment exists and is quantitative important.
Workers’ separation rates from jobs (Farber, 1994) and propensi-
ty to search on the job (Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1994) fall with
seniority. Wages rise modestly with seniority (Topel, 1991; Alton-
ji and Williams, 2005). Layoffs predict a sizable and persistent
wage loss (Jacobson et Al., 1993), and job-to-job quits a signifi-
cant wage gain (Topel and Ward, 1992). Cross-sectionally, the vari-
ance of wages rises with the age of a cohort, the wage distribu-
tion is typically unimodal, skewed, with a long Paretian tail,
whether one controls or not for observed worker characteristics,
unexplained wage differentials are positively correlated with firm
size (for a recent review, Mortensen, 2005), with occupational ex-
perience (Kambourov and Manovskii, 2002), and correlated with
industry membership (Kruger and Summers, 1988). 
When taken together, these facts impose formidable restric-
tions. Contemporary macroeconomics almost universally em-
braces the so called Flow Approach, a view of the labor market
as a tremendously dynamic place, where transitions between em-
ployment states and wage determination constantly interact. This
is in stark contrast to the competitive view where, absent adjust-
ment costs and frictions, stocks of demand and supply confront
each other in a sequence of essentially unrelated spot markets. Al-
beit economic theory is the art of finding the innocuously sim-
plifying assumptions to focus on a subset of facts, in this case we
should be wary of counterfactual predictions for the other facts,
either wage dispersion, dynamics, or/and worker turnover. The
basic philosophy of the Flow Approach is that these phenomena
are intimately inter-related and cannot be explained in isolation,
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5or in the context of a single employment relationship surrounded
by a market vacuum. 
The two classes of explanations for wage differentials that I
focus on, job matching and pure search frictions, hardly exhaust
the spectrum of possibilities. Effciency wages, insurance, dual
labor markets, and many other hypotheses are still alive and well.
But, they have never been developed in a full-fledged general
equilibrium context. They are typically partial equilibrium and/or
static stories, that have little to say about the observed joint
dynamics of quantities and prices in aggregate labor markets. For
example, they have a hard time explaining why separation rates
fall with tenure and seniority, why the variance of wages in a
cohort rises with age, why the wage distribution has a thick right
tail, and so on. 
In the job-matching model, workers keep searching on and
off the job until they find a match that looks good enough. Wages
must reflect expected match quality (productivity) to induce the
worker to search. Because jobs take time to locate, involuntary
unemployment exists and is quantitative important. Workers’ sep-
aration rates from jobs and their propensity to search on the job
fall with seniority, because long-tenured workers are likely to be
those who are well matched and no longer need to shop for jobs.
For the same reasons, wages rise with seniority, when a match
dissolves exogenously (a layoff, say) all the matching human cap-
ital accumulated through trial-and-error goes lost, so a layoff pre-
dicts a sizable and persistent wage loss, and job-to-job quits only
occur if the worker gains. As learning and sorting take place, some
workers are luckier than others and their wages grow faster, so
the wages of a given cohort «fan out» as time goes by. The whole
sorting process shifts workers to good matches and creates the
thick right tail in the wage distribution. 
Different industries may be subject to different noise which
makes the sorting process more or less efficient, thus creating
equilibrium wage differentials. If the most important match for a
worker is with her career and not with the specific firm, then oc-
cupational tenure matters most. The firm size-wage premium is
difficult to explain in this context. 
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6In the simplest monopsony-frictional model, identical firms
commit to wage offers and trade off the labor cost of each work-
er against firm size through the effects of wages on hiring and
retention. The key is that workers can search on the job, so firms
will not extract all rents with their unilateral wage offers, be-
cause that would increase turnover. In equilibrium, identical
firms must offer different wages, that make them indifferent: if
they all offered the same wage, a single firm could gain lots of
workers by paying just a little bit more than the others. Again,
because jobs take time to locate, involuntary unemployment ex-
ists and is quantitative important. Over time, workers climb the
wage ladder through job-to-job quits, so long-tenured workers
must be those who have already found a high wage and are un-
likely to separate and search on the job. When a match dissolves
exogenously the worker has to restart from scratch his ladder-
climbing. Quits, again, occur only to firms that pay better. As
ladder-climbing is a random process, some workers are luckier
than others and their wages grow faster, so the wages of a giv-
en cohort «fan out» as time goes by. The firm size-wage premi-
um is the natural outcome of this equilibrium. Inter-industry
wage differentials may exist because in some industries, say, all
firms prefer to pay high wages and have a large labor force; thus,
wage premia go hand-in-hand with inter-industry size differen-
tials. Similarly for different occupations: occupational tenure
may be good for wages just because correlated with working for
a high-wage firm, although this is a quite contrived rationale.
Explaining the shape of the wage distribution has proven elu-
sive in this context. 
In the following sections, I lay out a barebone model of equi-
librium wage dispersion generated by search frictions, along the
lines of Burdett and Mortensen (1998), and I summarize a job
matching model of equilibrium wage dispersion. The goal is to
present them back-to-back in a common notation and in their sim-
plest forms, to bring out the similarities and differences. Finally,
I evaluate their respective pros and cons. I conclude with a sum-
mary of what we have learned and with some suggestions for fu-
ture research.
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72. - Monopsony Power in Search Equilibrium
This section draws from Burdett and Mortensen (1998), a sim-
ple continuous time search model of the labor market without re-
call but with sequential offers to employed workers. 
A unit measure of identical risk-neutral workers and a meas-
ure m > 1 of identical firms maximize payoffs, discounted at rate
r > 0 by workers and undiscounted by firms. Output is produced
by firms and workers with a Leontief technology, in 1:1 matches
of same productivity µ. Each firm can hire as many workers as
desired and as allowed by the frictional search process. An unem-
ployed worker receives a payoff b and contacts a firm at Poisson
rate  , at no cost. The contact rate   is taken as exogenous, but it
can be easily endogenized through a standard matching function,
given unemployment and the number of firms hiring. An employed
worker is paid a wage w and contacts another potential employer
at rate ζ , at no cost. Matches separate exogenously at rate δ, and
the worker becomes unemployed; they separate endogenously
when a worker quits to another job. Firms make unilateral and
unconditional (on the employment status of the applicant) wage
offers and, by assumption, can commit to them. 
When making and committing to (“posting”) a wage offer, a
firm weighs the higher wage bill against the increased ability to
hire and retain workers, therefore the larger size and output it
can attain. Burdett and Mortensen (1998) study the steady-state
sequential Nash equilibrium of this wage-posting dynamic game,
which results in an endogenous distribution of wage offers and of
wages paid to workers. 
If ζ = 0, i.e. a worker must go through unemployment to find
another job, Diamond (1971) established the well-known paradox
that the unique equilibrium features wage offers all equal to the
reservation wage w = b. I.e., the extreme monopsony outcome oc-
curs for any arbitrarily small friction   < ∞, in contrast to the com-
petitive allocation that would give all rents to the workers in the
frictionless case (  →∞ ). If search has any cost for workers, the
market shuts down, because workers can never recover their in-
vestment in search. The root of this result is the combination of
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8monopsony power and the inability of the firms to commit to wage
offers before receiving applications. To break the Diamond para-
dox, Burdett and Mortensen assumed ζ > 0, on-the-job search. For
simplicity, here I set ζ = 1, so job search is equally productive from
unemployment or employment. A firm may either post a wage or
wait until applications actually arrive to make its wage offers. Af-
ter the offer is made and accepted, the firm cannot change it. 
Let  u denote the unemployment rate, F denote the c.d.f. of
offered wages, and G the c.d.f. of paid wages. The densities of F
and G, if they exist, are (resp.) f and g. It is intuitive, so I omit
the proof, that the lower bound of either wage distribution must
be b, the worker’s reservation value. Only if ζ > 1, i.e. if employ-
ment made search for other wage offers more effective, would an
unemployed worker accept a wage below b, so the support of F
would extend below that level. By the same token, b must be in
the support of the wage distribution G, because always acceptable
to unemployed workers. 
A key observation is that F cannot have atoms. If there was
an atom of firms offering the same wage w, then any firm could
post a wage w + ε for some small ε, pay its workers just a little
more, but win the competition for all workers employed at wage
w who search on the job, a discrete mass. So firm size would
jump and the unit labor cost would not, raising profits. Ergo, F
must be continuous. 
When a firm posts a wage w, it attains a steady state labor
force of size L(w) and makes average profits (µ – w)L(w). It is
easy to see that:
where the first fraction has in the numerator the number of work-
er being paid wages between w – ε and w, and the denominator
is the number of firms offering those wages, so the ratio is the
number of workers per firm at those wages. 
The two distributions are linked in steady state by an equal-
ity of flows. Let u denote the unemployment rate. Then the num-









[() ( )]( )












Equilibrium Wage Dispersion: Monopsony or Sorting? G. MOSCARINI
9ber of unemployed workers who find a job at a wage less than w
equals the number of workers employed at those wages who ei-
ther flow into unemployment or upgrade to a higher wage.
λF (w) u = [δ + λ (1 – F (w))]G(w) (1 - u)
This guarantees that the number of workers who are em-
ployed and paid less than w, namely G(w), does not change over
time. At the highest possible wage – w ≤ µ, we have clearly F (– w) =
G(– w) = 1, so I can solve for the stationary unemployment rate:
Substituting and rearranging:
Taking derivatives on both sides, the densities exist and
and finally the labor force size of a firm paying a wage w equals: 
All firms, including those posting the lowest wage b, must
make in equilibrium the same profits: for all wages in the sup-
port of the wage offer distribution F (all wages actually offered to
job applicants):
while, for all other wages, π≤(µ – b) δ/(δ + λ). We obtain a unique
steady state wage offer distribution, which then determines the
supremum – w of the support,
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10and the wage distributions F and G:
The wage density:
is increasing: in order to convince some firms to pay higher wages
to all workers, the number of competitors who are crowded out
by the higher wage must rise fast enough. 
This is the unique equilibrium of the wage-posting game.
Identical firms must offer different wages, to create sufficient wage
dispersion and sufficient incentives to support it. With monopsony
power and on-the-job search, turnover is so central to a firm’s
profits that a unique wage paid by identical firms to identical
workers is not sustainable. Pure wage dispersion obtains solely as
a result of equilibrium interaction. The uniqueness of the equi-
librium makes this prediction particularly compelling. While the
idea of “effciency wages” as a resolution of the firm’s turnover
problem has been around for a long time, its discussions have al-
ways been vague, ambiguous, and unproductive, because typical-
ly framed in partial equilibrium and rarely backed by rigorous for-
mal analysis. In short, until Burdett and Mortensen’s article, this
line of thinking was, essentially, just an interesting hypothesis with
no empirical content. The model brings out the surprising impli-
cation that wage dispersion is a necessary outcome, and exposes
both the solid and the flawed parts of past debates. 
To  recap. Workers match randomly with firms. Each firm
offers the same wage w to all applicants, and commits to any
accepted wage. So the firm follows a “wage policy”. An un-
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11offers from F(w')/[1–F(w)]. So a worker’s wage drifts up, the
probability of a quit to another firm (of a better offer) drifts down,
actual wages for a cohort of workers “fan out”. Firms offer
different wages to sustain an equilibrium where no firm has an
incentive to deviate to steal workers from its competitors. When
a match is hit by a separation shock at rate δ, the worker has to
restart from scratch: he faces a wage distribution F(w'), which is
worse than F(w')/[1–F(w)], so he matches faster but is paid less
on average than employed workers.
3. - Sorting and Job-Matching in Search Equilibrium
This section draws from Moscarini (2005). Consider the same
setup, but now assume that the average productivity or “quality”
of each match, µ, is specific and ex ante uncertain: upon match-
ing, nature draws µ, independent of past events, from the lottery
p0 = Pr(µ = µH) = 1 – Pr(µ = µL) ∈ (0, 1), where µL denotes a “bad”
match and µH(> µL) a “good” match. Worker and firm do not know
µ. This can be thought of as the result of combining hard-to-de-
scribe and privately known firm and worker characteristics. The
cumulative output of a match of duration t is a normal random
variable with mean µ and known variance σ
2:
Xt ~   (µt, σ
2t)
Gaussian white noise keeps µ hidden and creates an inference
problem. Over time, parties observe output realizations and update
in a Bayesian fashion their belief from the prior p0 to the poster-
ior pt ≡ Pr(µ = µH | Xt). Firms are in excess supply (m is unbounded
above), they also discount payoffs at rate r like workers, and b ∈
[µL, (1 – p0)µL +  p0µH], so that a match is always accepted but
sometimes later discarded, if suffciently unproductive. In practice,
the firm and the worker perform a sequential probability ratio test
of simple hypotheses on the viability of the match. Critically, now
firm and worker cannot commit to a wage contract/offer, but they
split match rents according to a generalized Nash bargaining rule,
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12assigning a geometric weight β to the worker’s surplus. When a
worker receives an outside offer, an ascending auction between the
two firms (employer and poacher) ensues, followed by renewed
Nash bargaining between the worker and the winner of the auc-
tion. The other assumptions about job finding rates λ∈(0, ∞), ζ
= 1 and job destruction rate δ > 0 are unchanged. Again, I study
a steady state equilibrium of this economy. 
A sufficient statistic for output history, which determines the
future prospects of a match, thus also the natural state variable
of the bargaining game, is the posterior belief pt that the match
was a success (µ = µH). Because match quality is specific, we can
interpret the accumulated knowledge pt to be “firm-specific hu-
man capital”. Conditional on the output process X, the posterior
probability of a good match evolves from any prior p0 ∈ (0, 1) as
a martingale diffusion solving:




is the signal/noise ratio of output, and
is the innovation process, the normalized difference between
realized and unconditionally expected flow output.
2 Intuitively,
beliefs move faster the more uncertain match quality (the term
p(1–p) peaks at p = 1/2), and the more informative production, as
measured by the signal/noise ratio s. When flow output dXt per
unit time is above current expectations [ptµH + (1–pt)µL]dt, beliefs
rise and the worker-firm pair becomes more optimistic that their
match “works”. 
Let W(p) denote the discounted total payoffs that a worker re-
ceives in the equilibrium of the bargaining-and-search game, when
(0, ) t
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2 Formally,  – Z is Wiener with respect to the filtration induced by output ob-
servations. employed in a match that is successful with current posterior
chance p and when paid an equilibrium wage w(p). Similarly, let
U denote the worker’s value of unemployment, independent of p
because of the match-specific nature of match quality µ, J(p) the
rents of the firms, V the value to the firm of holding an open va-
cancy. I seek an equilibrium where W and J are strictly increas-
ing in p.
For the worker, these values solve the Bellman equations: 
rU = b + λ[W(p0) – U]
rW(p)=w(p)+∑(p)W''(p)–δ[W(p)–U]+λ max 〈W(p0)–W(p),0〉
where:






is half the ex ante variance of the change in posterior beliefs.
Roughly speaking, this term measures the “speed of Bayesian
learning” about match quality: if posterior beliefs are not expect-
ed to change in the next instant, the variance is zero and nothing
is learned.
To understand the Bellman equation for U, notice that the op-
portunity cost of unemployment, rU, equals its flow benefit b plus
the capital gain W(p0)–U from a new match, which has prior be-
lief  p0 of being successful, accruing at rate λ. Similarly, the op-
portunity cost rW(p) of working in a job that is successful with
posterior chance p equals the flow wage w(p), plus a diffusion-
learning term ∑(p)W″(p), minus the capital loss following exogen-
ous separation at rate δ. The learning speed ∑(p) is converted into
consumption payoffs by the convexity of the Bellman value W″(p),
because information (here in the form of output) spreads poste-
rior beliefs and empowers more informed decisions by the work-
er. The worker optimally quits to unemployment at every belief
– pW ∈ [0, 1] such that W(– pW) = U (value matching) and W'(– pW) =
0 (smooth pasting). Similarly, the worker stops searching on the
job when beliefs that the match works exceed the belief p0 of a
new match. This behavior imposes analogous optimality condi-
tions at p0. 
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14The problem of the firm is similar. The free entry condition
V = 0 is used to close the general equilibrium. The value to the
employer J(p) of an active match that is successful with posterior
chance p solves the Bellman equation:
rJ(p) = ¯ µ(p) – w(p) + ∑(p)J″(p) – J(p) {δ + I I(W(p)<W(p0))}
The opportunity cost of production rJ(p) equals expected flow
output:
¯ µ(p) ≡ pµH + (1 – p)µL
minus the wage w(p), plus the return from learning the quality of
the match ∑(p)J″(p), minus the expected capital loss due to ex-
ogenous separation (δJ(p)) or to a worker’s quit to another firm
(which happens when the worker gains from a quit: W(p) < W(p0);
here I I is an indicator function). The firm optimally fires the work-
er at every – pJ ∈ [0, 1] such that J(– pJ) = 0 and J′(– pJ) = 0. 
The generalized Nash bargaining solution selects a wage on
the Pareto frontier:




for some worker bargaining power β∈(0, 1) exogenously given.
After some algebra, we obtain a simple and intuitive expression:
w(p) = (1 – β) b + β [– µ(p) + λJ(p0)(1 – ψI I{J(p) < J(p0)})]
The worker receives a wage that weighs with the bargaining
share his flow outside option, the opportunity cost of time b, and
his inside option, flow expected output – µ(p), plus the continuat-
ion value of unemployed job search βλJ(p0) = (1 – β)[W(p0) – U],
reduced by the prospect of a quit that reduces match surplus but
raises the worker’s outside option. 
The wage is affine and increasing in the posterior belief. Also,
the separation cutoff – p is agreed upon: any inefficient separation
can be avoided by an appropriate wage raise/cut. However, when
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15a worker quits to another better match, the current employer loses
and cannot do anything about it. 
Replacing the wage expression back in the firm’s Bellman
equation allows to solve for the firm’s value J, the separation cut-
off – p, and the wage function. The value to a firm J and to a work-
er W is convex in the belief p that the match is successful. 
To  recap. A firm and a worker match randomly. They know
that their match is successful with chance p0. They start pro-
ducing and update beliefs about their match quality based on out-
put performance. The match-specific rents that develop are split
in a bargaining game. Wages reflect not directly output, but rather
its permanent component, as summarized by beliefs or “promise”
of the match: the better the match looks, the higher the wage
(and the firm’s expected future profits). When moderately pes-
simistic, the firm and the worker keep producing but the work-
er accepts outside offers, which restart new matches that are
more promising than what the current one turned out to be.
When sufficiently pessimistic, the firm and the worker separate
to unemployment.
A fundamental property of Bayesian learning is that beliefs are
martingales: they (thus here wages) are not expected to rise or fall
on average. This is the same reason why asset prices are unfore-
castable in efficient markets. But only good matches survive. 
Thus, low output realizations and beliefs are discarded and
not reflected in actual market wages. Therefore, in a continuing
job, the wage rises on average (although not for sure) with tenure,
while the propensity to quit to unemployment or to another job
declines with seniority. This fundamental prediction is the result
of the interaction of efficient learning and sorting/selection. 
The wage offer distribution F in this model is very simple: it
is just an atom at w(p0). Raising the offer to attract workers is
impossible, because now the firm can no longer commit to a wage
offer, and can only bargain ex post with negotiation power 1 – β.
Over time, the worker makes transitions in and out of employ-
ment, and sees his wage rise or fall with output and the resulting
inference about match quality. The ergodic distribution of beliefs
has a density φ that solves the Kolmogorov forward equation:
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16[∑(p)φ(p)] – (δ + λI I{–
p ≤ p < p0})φ(p)
subject to appropriate boundary conditions, ensuring the constan-
cy of unemployment and employment in steady state. In a large
economy, this density is also the cross-sectional density of workers
by beliefs about match quality. This differential equation can be
solved analytically for φ. Inverting the equilibrium map from beliefs
to wages, we can solve for the steady state wage density: 
(3.2)
where cif and ωi, i = 0, 1, are known coeffcients. The support of
the wage distribution is [w(–
p), 1 + ω1]. 
This expression has two important implications. First, the the-
oretical equilibrium wage distribution g(w) may potentially repli-
cate the typical shape of an empirical wage distribution, includ-
ing its well-known Paretian right tail. Quits to other jobs and to
unemployment weed out disproportionately bad matches, censor
the left tail, and skew the distribution. 
The distribution has in fact a globally declining right tail,
which gives it overall an empirically accurate shape, if δ≥s
2, that
is, if matches are destroyed exogenously before selection can place
too many workers in their ideal matches. Moscarini (2003) pres-
ents a detailed quantitative evaluation of a discrete time version
of this model at a monthly frequency, and shows that the restric-
tion δ   s
2 = 0.011 is required to match aggregate empirical evi-
dence on US labor market transitions. 
The second result is that the right tail of the wage distribution
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17g(w) decays faster the larger the ratio δ/s
2 between the exogenous
match dissolution rate δ and the (squared) informativeness of
output  s
2. Intuitively, when jobs are at high risk of exogenous
destruction (δ is large), or when the output process is very noisy
and uninformative, so beliefs move slowly (σ is large and the
signal/noise ratio s is low), the learning-selection process has no
time to produce its effects. A “noisy” economy is “sclerotic”: high
idiosyncratic output uncertainty unrelated to firm and worker
characteristics (high δ and  σ) clouds the intrinsic inequality in
productivities (µ) and prevents it from being reflected by
equilibrium prices. Wages remain concentrated around their
starting value w(p0); income inequality tends to be dampened,
rather than enhanced, by high idiosyncratic output risk. 
4. - Discussion 
The two views of labor markets analyzed in this article share
many common elements, such as frictional matching, on the job
search and involuntary unemployment. But they are conceptually
very different. The main difference is wage-setting. In the monop-
sony approach, only firms can determine wages, but they can cred-
ibly promise workers to maintain announced wages. In the job-
matching approach, the firm has no such commitment power, so
the worker must be endowed with some exogenous bargaining
power to receive any rents. 
As a consequence, the sources of wage dynamics, turnover
and wage dispersion are also quite different. In the monopsony
approach, wage dispersion in a market of identical agents is a
necessary outcome of strategic interaction. On the job search is
necessary to temper the firm’s monopsony power, and to make
hiring and retention depend on the wage offer. Workers slowly
and randomly, but monotonically, climb the ladder from small,
low-wage firms to large, high-paying employers. Any exogenous
displacements resets the clock and restarts the climbing process.
Burdett and Coles (2003) let firms offer (and commit to) wage-
tenure profiles, as opposed to constant wages, and repeat the
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18exercise. Now wages rise deterministically but constantly with
seniority within a job: backloading wages without changing their
present discounted value to the worker reduces turnover and helps
the firm. 
In the job matching approach, on the job search simply
reinforces a sorting/selection process that would take place anyway
through transitions via unemployment. Since unemployment is
painful, job-to-job quits are an integral part of the story, but only
quantitatively. Workers and firms slowly learn whether their
heterogeneous characteristics combine well or not. Ex post
heterogeneity in productivity is the engine of wage dynamics, wage
dispersion, and turnover. Equilibrium selection keeps alive only
good matches, that pay high wages. Exogenous displacements and
workers’ quits to other jobs destroy all job-specific human capital. 
The two models explain the same facts in very different ways.
The job matching approach features more interesting and realistic
dynamics “on-the-job”, and similar dynamics across jobs; but firm
size is indeterminate, due to the match-specific nature of prod-
uctivity and to the assumption of constant returns to scale. The
monopsony model has a richer description of a firm’s problem,
where turnover and firm size take centerstage. The wage plays
more of an allocative role, rather than just imperfectly reflecting
productivity. But the within-firm wage dynamics are more stylized.
In short, dynamics and wages are driven by selection across
heterogeneous firms in the job matching approach, by competition
among identical firms in the monopsony approach. 
The efficiency implications are also quite different. In the
monopsony approach, job-to-job quits have a pure rent-shifting
purpose, and do not change output. The model can be enriched
to allow for permanent differences in firms’ productivites µ, but
then it resembles more a sorting model. In the latter approach,
quits and separations are always welfare and output-improving,
because they originate from the need to eliminate unsuccessful
matches and to try something better. 
Both models appear quite successful at matching this wealth
of evidence. Which are their main empirical weaknesses? The
monopsony approach has struggled to produce unimodal wage
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dispersion is its central implication, it is of the wrong kind (in
equation (2.1), g is increasing). The introduction of firm hetero-
geneity (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002a), ex post competition for
employed workers (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002b), and continu-
ous on-the-job search effort (Christensen et Al., 2005) goes a long
way, but at the cost of introducing free and fundamentally unob-
servable parameters. The job matching approach, conversely, can
replicate even the Pareto shape of the distribution, under the fair-
ly natural assumption of Gaussian noise in production (see equa-
tion (3.2)). But, it cannot naturally explain the firm size-wage pre-
mium, which is a very robust property of all market economies
and an unavoidable outcome of the monopsony model. 
It is plausible that reality contains a bit of both hypotheses,
as well as of other factors affecting wage dispersion, dynamics
and worker turnover. The question is really which model best
approximates reality. This is a quantitative question, that can be
settled only by direct structural estimation of these models, using
matched employer-employee data. Work in this area has just
begun.
5. - Conclusions 
In this article, I have reviewed in parallel and evaluated two
leading views of equilibrium wage dispersion, of wage dynamics
and worker turnover: the job-matching theory of sorting and the
monopsony theory of sequential search with outside offers. Until
recently, the two traditions have evolved virtually ignoring each
other. I have tried to demonstrate that they address the same phe-
nomena, they explain them quite differently, but they also share
a common core of assumptions. The relative strengths and weak-
nesses of the two approaches make them valid competitors, while
other aspects that are likely to be important in labor markets (such
as asymmetric information, incentives, insurance) so far lack an
equally consistent and tractable equilibrium analysis, and there-
fore cannot be judged by the same standards. 
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considerably. Are similar workers paid differently because they are
inherently different, in a way that only a slow and frictional
process can reveal even to them? Or because, for purely strategic
reasons also supported by search frictions, firms adopt «wage
policies», possibly accepting a lower profit margin to hire and
retain a larger labor force? Answering this question is a priority
in labor and macroeconomics. We need more theoretical analysis,
to flesh out additional “robust” and testable implications of these
two different views, and above all we need much empirical work
to test the numerous predictions that we already know. The central
role that general equilibrium effects and the wage distribution play
in the recent incarnations of these theories suggests that reduced-
form regressions must be abandoned, in favor of structural
estimation building on the equilibrium restrictions.
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